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ersonifications in medieval literature have for the greater part
appeared in female form. In being personified, an abstract concept
is translated to a “sentient human capable of thought and language,
possessing voice and face.”1 The concept receives a human identity, and
included in that identity is gender. Which gender it receives is partly
dependent on the grammatical gender of the noun, and this explains why
personifications are mostly female: abstract nouns tend to be feminine.
However, the implications of the social identity of personifications
should not be disregarded. Even if grammar determines the gender of a
personification, it is clear that the gender of a personified figure in its
turn determines how this figure is described, what she can and cannot
do, and how she relates to others in a narrative. In fact, it is plausible that
the female gender of personifications is essential to how that personification functions, so that grammatical gender would be overruled if it would
not align with social gender. So, when asking why personifications are
so often female, it makes sense not to draw the line at grammar.
Therefore, we should not reduce personifications to grammar, but
neither should we do the reverse and reduce them to the concepts that
they stand for. The latter is a way of thinking about personifications
that is apparent in Barbara Newman’s book God and the Goddesses:

1. James J. Paxson, The Poetics of Personification (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 1994), 42.
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Vision, Poetry, and Belief in the Middle Ages.2 This book was the first to
comprehensively engage with the gender of personifications. It brilliantly
describes how feminine aspects of God are personified and function as
mediators between humans and the divine. Newman calls these allegorical figures “goddesses” instead of “female personifications” in order to
stress the fact that these figures were not mere literary ornaments, but
instead enjoyed a high degree of spiritual reality and were integral to
the kind of thinking that she calls “imaginative theology.”3 However,
Newman starts out from the observation that “[t]o conceive of goddesses . . . is not to evince any particular attitude toward women. It is
simply to exercise the religious imagination.” 4 I want to suggest that
Newman’s own book indicates otherwise. I do not contradict the fact
that many medieval personifications carry deep spiritual meaning, only
that this would make them immune to social meaning. We should not
deem personifications, as representations of the religious imagination,
to be uninfluenced by the workings of social identity. Gender is essential
to ideational constructs as well.5
Many scholars have expanded these grammatical and theological
views on female personifications to explanations based on gender theory.
In this article, I would like to map the different theories that have been
proposed and offer a framework for uniting them. The problem with
the literature on this subject is not that there is a lack of valuable propositions, but rather that most authors position themselves exclusively
against the theory of grammatical determinism and not in relation to
2. Barbara Newman, God and the Goddesses: Vision, Poetry, and Belief in the Middle
Ages (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2003).
3. Newman, 292-304. Newman defines imaginative theology as follows:
“Imaginative theology is the pursuit of serious religious and theological thought
through the techniques of imaginative literature, especially vision, dialogue, and
personification” (292).
4. Newman, 39.
5. As is attested to by the work of Caroline Walker Bynum: Jesus As Mother: Studies
In the Spirituality of the High Middle Ages (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1982); Holy Feast and Holy Fast: the Religious Significance of Food to Medieval Women
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987); Fragmentation and Redemption:
Essays on Gender and the Human Body in Medieval Religion (New York: Zone Books,
1992).
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other theories. Because of this, multiple partial theories exist whose only
lack is that they claim exclusivity; they actually do not contradict each
other, but can, on the contrary, be fitted into one framework.
I want to base this framework, first, on the existing research on sex,
gender, and sexuality in the Middle Ages. The field is enormously fruitful, which will allow me to build my arguments about personification
on these theories without further argumentation on my part about the
nature of medieval sex, gender, and sexuality; references will suffice.6 I
will only give an introduction as to how this literature corresponds to
the theoretical framework that I want to use, which is Simone de Beauvoir’s existential philosophy of gender as developed in The Second Sex.
Of special interest here is the relation between binary and hierarchical
conceptions of gender. I will then bring together in this framework the
critical literature on personification allegory by giving an overview of the
arguments that are used to explain the female gender of personifications.
I will distinguish three levels to which these explanations refer: the
personifier, the personified, and the personification as a literary figure.
The first is the representation of a female figure at the literal level; the
second is the idea that is represented by that female figure and after
which she is named; and the third is the literary practice of personification. These terms are borrowed from James Paxson, who models them
on the structuralist concept of a sign as consisting of a signifier and a
signified. The personifier is described by him as “a standardized narrative actant: s/he is a mobile and active human being, endowed with
speech, and representative of a specific psychological, physiological,
and ideological constitution.”7 The personified is what gets “figurally
translated into the personifier.”8
My goal is to show that the same concepts reappear at every level.
6. My main sources are the work of Caroline Walker Bynum (see note 5); Framing
medieval bodies, ed. Sarah Kay and Miri Rubin (Manchester: Manchester University
Press, 1994); Ruth Mazo Karras, Sexuality in Medieval Europe: Doing Unto Others
(New York: Routledge, 2005); The Oxford Handbook of Women and Gender in
Medieval Europe, ed. Judith M. Bennett and Ruth Mazo Karras (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2013).
7. Paxson, The Poetics of Personification, 40.
8. Paxson, 40.
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These concepts that one finds governing the ideational value of the
personified concept as well as the dominant literary discourse about personification are the same ones that structure gender relations. Therefore,
the choice for a female personification character indicates a use of the
social structures of gender at every level of the personification allegory.
In short, the article provides a structured overview of research that corroborates the hypothesis that the appearance of female personifications
as literary figures entails the use of women’s bodies both as bearers of
symbolism and gender roles in a patriarchal society.
I define personification, following Paxson, as “the translation of any
non-human quantity into a sentient human capable of thought and
language, possessing voice and face.” 9 Paxson categorizes personification as a subset of anthropomorphism (“the figural translation of any
non-human quantity into a character that has human form”), which is
in turn the subset of the general category substantialization (“the figural translation of any non-corporeal quantity into a physical, corporeal
one”).10 A personification figure has to possess voice and face, which
means that the figure should be described and should speak. Personification allegory is thus more than a trope. To say that the Church is
the mother of the faithful is to use personification as a trope, but the
Church becomes an allegorical character only when her appearance is
described in a text, when she interacts with her children and speaks to
them.11 This is the actual subject of the article, but because there is
much useful literature on the use of the gendered metaphors closely
connected to these personifications, I will also refer tothis literature to
corroborate my argument.
Personifications may embody either “concepts, values, abstractions or

9. Paxson, 42.
10. Paxson, 42.
11. Paxson distinguishes between personification figures, which are “all implementings of the trope personification in narrative, in the short lyric, in drama, in
non-verbal arts, in rhetorically ornamental fictional dialogue or in everyday speech,”
and personification characters, which is “the employment of the trope in the narratorial invention of actual characters, objects, or places that occupy the material spacetime of the fabular, or ‘story’ level of a narrative text.” Paxson, 35.
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generalities.”12 This article focuses on those “concepts, values, abstractions or generalities” that are valued positively, because it is there that
modern (and sometimes pre-modern) readers discern a paradox: why
would a society that generally devalues the feminine in favor of the
masculine represent its highest, most noble or most divine concepts as
women? Of course, what also has to be taken into account is the sheer
force of tradition. The decisive factor in making personifications female
is the fact that there is a literary tradition of female personification. Still,
it is the way in which the gender of these personifications is then used
rhetorically that is of interest here. Furthermore, my framework only
seeks to explain the female gender of personifications on the theoretical level; how personifications might function in the practice of reading
and what ethical implications might follow is not further elaborated.
This article gives a structured overview of the hypotheses that have
been posited with regard to the female gender of personifications in
medieval literature. Sometimes these hypotheses are founded on texts
from other historical periods as well; I take these into account when I
think they may prove useful for medieval texts. I have thus tried to be
as inclusive as possible, with the consequence of making generalizations
that disregard the specificity of historical periods, literary genres, and
individual authors. However, my article is meant first and foremost as an
aid to further and more specific research on the topic. Not all hypotheses
will apply equally to any specific personification or allegorical text, nor
will they apply as straightforwardly and harmoniously as is assumed
here. Especially considering the fact that the concept of gender itself
is constantly in motion and made up of constantly shifting relations, it
is obvious that a general framework can never capture this complexity.
However, a broad overview of all the elements that could be taken into
account when assessing female personifications can still be useful. It
can provide a touchstone for measuring the similarities between and
specificities of individual texts.
12. Daisy Delogu, Allegorical Bodies: Power and Gender in Late Medieval France
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2015), 20.
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Simone de Beauvoir’s Philosophy of Gender and
Medieval Conceptions of Gender
I want to build my framework on the principles structuring gender relations that we can derive from Simone de Beauvoir’s classical work The
Second Sex. This existential-phenomenological study of gender looks at
Jean-Paul Sartre’s process of “othering” in its most basic form, namely
the relation between man and woman.13 Just as every individual is a
radically free self who reduces others to the objects of his/her consciousness, woman has been made the object in relation to man the subject:
“She is defined and differentiated with reference to man and not he with
reference to her; she is the incidental, the inessential as opposed to the
essential. He is the Subject, he is the Absolute—she is the Other.”14
Woman is thus defined as the object of a subject that is both positive
and neutral. When she is opposed to man, she is viewed negatively. In a
binary opposition, man and woman, or masculinity and femininity, are
characterized respectively as rational and irrational, transcendent and
immanent, active and passive, productive and reproductive, individual
and collective, spirit and body. However, woman is not only associated
with the negative. Because she is everything that man is not, she is both
what he fears and despises, as what he hopes for and desires. De Beauvoir
explains how woman, as “the Other,” can be both evil and good: “The
Other is Evil; but being necessary to the Good, it turns into the Good;
through it I attain to the Whole, but it also separates me therefrom;
it is the gateway to the infinite and the measure of my finite nature.”15
13. Simone de Beauvoir, The Second Sex, trans. H. M. Parshley (London: Alfred
A. Knopf, 1997).
14. de Beauvoir, 16.
15. de Beauvoir, 175. “She is all that man desires and all that he does not attain. She
is the good mediatrix between propitious Nature and man; and she is the temptation
of unconquered Nature, counter to all goodness. She incarnates all moral values, from
good to evil, and their opposites; she is the substance of action and whatever is an
obstacle to it, she is man’s grasp on the world and his frustration: as such she is the
source and origin of all man’s reflection on his existence and of whatever expression
he is able to give to it . . . He projects upon her what he desires and what he fears,
what he loves and what he hates. And if it is so difficult to say anything specific about
her, that is because man seeks the whole of himself in her and because she is All. She
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Nature and the bodily existence of humans can be valued either negatively or positively. When women are opposed to men and placed lower
in the hierarchy, women are viewed negatively, but inasmuch as they
complete men and provide the material foundations for humankind,
they are viewed positively. So, on the one hand, we must attend to the
principles that structure the relation between self and other, namely
hierarchy, relationality, and the union of opposites, and, on the other
hand, we must take into account the specific characteristics that are
ascribed to women in this system: immanence, which involves corporality and sexuality, mediation, and collectivity. These characteristics are
ascribed to women because they describe a principle that is lower in the
hierarchy, that complements the higher principle to which it is opposed
but also essential. How do medieval conceptions of gender correspond
to this theory? We find that, if we want to give a general overview of
medieval systematic thinking about gender (which is, of course, different
from the lived experience of gender), these principles apply very well
to the Middle Ages. I am taking the broad category of “gender in the
Middle Ages” here to refer to the structures of gender that supposedly
did remain stable through the myriads of changes, negotiations ,and
contestations that make up the concept of gender at any given time
and place. Concepts such as the relation between self and other or the
immanence that is ascribed to women seem broad enough to carry all
of the theories that I will discuss and that pertain to different times
and places. The crucial point in my discussion will be how binary and
hierarchical ways of seeing gender are related.
In 1990, Thomas Laqueur proposed a radically new way of looking
at the history of sex and gender in his seminal work Making Sex: Body
and Gender from the Greeks to Freud.16 Building on Michel Foucault’s
theories of sexuality and his own extensive study of historical accounts
of anatomy, he posited that the western model of looking at sex and
gender is only as old as the Enlightenment. Before that period, he claims,
“men and women were arrayed according to their degree of metaphysical
is All, that is, on the plane of the inessential; she is all the Other” (229).
16. Thomas Laqueur, Making Sex: Body and Gender from the Greeks to Freud
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990).
mff ,

wouters
http://ir.uiowa.edu/mff/vol53/iss2/

11

perfection, their vital heat, along an axis whose telos was male.”17 So,
not only gender but also sex was a matter of degree and place in the hierarchy. In fact, Laqueur asserts that, whereas we now view the physical
body as “real” and cultural meanings as “epiphenomenal,” earlier periods
would have seen sex as an epiphenomenon to the primary category of
cultural gender: “To be a man or a woman was to hold a social rank, a
place in society, to assume a cultural role, not to be organically one or
the other of two incommensurable sexes. Sex before the seventeenth
century, in other words, was still a sociological and not an ontological
category.”18 However, medievalists have contested the extent to which
Laqueur’s concept is applicable to the Middle Ages. Joan Cadden, while
admitting that there is much evidence for Laqueur’s “one-sex model,”
points out that there is as much, if not more, evidence to be found for the
existence of other models as well.19 She advocates a view in which several
differing, overlapping, and contrasting models exist within a culture at
the same time. This is not Laqueur’s only generalization. He also focuses
almost exclusively on anatomical treatises, especially the illustrations
of female and male genitals as identical in form but reversed. Further,
he sees the Middle Ages merely as the period that latently carried over
ideas from Antiquity to the Renaissance. However, Galen’s treatise On
the Use of Parts, the classical work that supposedly spread the theory of
genital homology through the centuries, “did not play a direct role in
the main conversation about reproductive roles, sex determination, and
sexual pleasure in the natural philosophy or medicine of the late Middle
Ages,”20 according to Cadden, and Katharine Park confirms that “before
1500 [she] could find no convincing expressions of the idea of genital
homology at all, even as an alternative to be discarded.”21 Laqueur’s
model does not completely misrepresent medieval conceptions about
sex and gender, but it needs to be modified. Of course, there certainly
17. Laqueur, 5-6.
18. Laqueur, 8.
19. Joan Cadden. Meanings of Sex Difference In the Middle Ages: Medicine, Science,
and Culture (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
20. Cadden, 108.
21. Katharine Park, “Cadden, Laqueur, and the ‘one-sex body,’” Medieval Feminist
Forum 46, no.1 (2010): 99.
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was a hierarchy between the sexes. However, this does not mean that
medieval people did not also imagine two sexes opposed to each other:
“the binary opposition between men and women was extraordinarily
strong in medieval society. Although theorists might write that females
were defective males, their defects were significant enough that no one
seriously considered them the same as males; they were in a quite different category.”22
We may better understand how the idea of hierarchy and the binary
model of sex were reconciled in the Middle Ages by taking a look
at Christian Neoplatonist thought.23 In the Neoplatonist worldview,
everything in between pure being and non-being finds itself in a position of relativity: as an emanation from the One it is positive, but as a
derived form of being it is negative. Such is also the case with men and
women. Not only are they positioned within this hierarchy, with men
at a higher level of being than women, but also “male” and “female” are
used metaphorically to describe relations within the whole continuum.
Maleness means spirituality, intellect, and soul, a higher position, while
femaleness indicates materiality, the senses, and the body, or a lower
position. At every level, two entities, a lower and a higher principle,
come together to form a unity. Thus, woman is accorded a place that
is lower in the hierarchy, and she basically functions as the material for
men to inhabit, but she is not a defective man: her position is viewed
as positive inasmuch as it complements man’s being. Also, Christianity
values highly the self-sacrificing descent of a higher principle to lower
regions, even if it does not value the lower principle in itself. Christ
took on humanity to save all people, and his humanity corresponds to
a female position. That women signified the humanity of Christ could
be used to create a positive identity for themselves.24 We often find
22. Karras, Doing unto others, 5.
23. See Joan M. Ferrante, Woman As Image In Medieval Literature: From the
Twelfth Century to Dante (New York: Columbia University Press, 1975), 2; Londa
Schiebinger, “Feminine Icons: The Face of Early Modern Science,” Critical Inquiry
14, no.4 (1988): 673, http://www.jstor.org/stable/1343667: “The most fruitful context
for understanding the feminine icon is Christian Neoplatonism.” I will expand upon
this in the following section.
24. Bynum, Holy Feast and Holy Fast; Fragmentation.
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imagery of gender reversals in medieval literature, although men use this
rhetoric more than women, the latter stressing their humanity instead
of their difference from men.25 Medieval writers and artists thus used
gender imagery “more fluidly and less literally than we do,” which does
not imply that social roles were any less strict or hierarchic, but which
did open up symbolic possibilities.26 There is, of course, much that
escapes from the hierarchical binary, characteristics and configurations
of personifications that do not quite fit into this system. The study of
these instances promises to be most interesting. I believe, however, that
personifications were conceptualized within a way of thinking gender as
binary and hierarchical and of seeing these two aspects as indissolubly
intertwined. I do not think female personifications defy gender norms
by their mere existence. Neither do I think that they inevitably conform
to those norms. This article, sketching the position of personifications
within the system, will not be able to show where they diverge from it,
but this is not to deny that they often do.

A Framework for Analyzing the Gender of Personifications
The most basic way of explaining the gender of the majority of late
antique, medieval, and early modern personifications is by pointing out
that they materialize abstract nouns of the feminine grammatical gender.
If personification allegory relies on the “reification of language itself,”27
such as the animation of nouns, then of course feminine nouns are reified as female persons. As Maureen Quilligan explains, “personifications
of abstractions such as Philosophy and Nature take the feminine form
primarily because allegory always works narratively by literalizing lexical
25. Bynum, Fragmentation. Christina Cedillo, “Habitual Gender: Rhetorical
Androgyny in Franciscan Texts,” Journal of Feminist Studies in Religion 31, no.1 (2015):
65-81, doi:10.2979/jfemistudreli.31.1.65.
26. Caroline Walker Bynum, “The Body of Christ in the Later Middle
Ages: A Reply to Leo Steinberg,” Renaissance Quarterly 39, no.3 (1986): 434,
doi:10.2307/2862038.
27. Maureen Quilligan, The Language of Allegory: Defining the Genre (Ithaca,
NY: Cornell University Press, 1979), 115. Maureen Quilligan, The Allegory of Female
Authority: Christine de Pizan’s “Cité des Dames” (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
Press, 1991).
mff ,

wouters
http://ir.uiowa.edu/mff/vol53/iss2/

14

effects. The gender of abstract nouns made from verbs in Latin is always
feminine … and so the personifications embodying these concepts take
on the gender of the words: Lady Philosophy, Lady Fortuna.”28 This
explanation was first used in modern times by Joseph Addison and has
been used as a sufficient explication many times since.29 Evidence that
grammar plays a role in determining the gender of personifications is
the fact that, after grammatical gender declined in European vernaculars
around the turn of the millennium, male personifications started to
appear more often. In English literature, for instance, Alfred the Great
translated Boethius’ Philosophia as the male Wisdom, and both Langland
and Bunyan employed a majority of male personifications.30
However, one of the earliest uses of the grammatical argument from
a ninth century commentary on Boethius’s The Consolation of Philosophy
immediately makes clear that we cannot rest content with the explanation offered by grammar alone:
[Boethius] conjures up a picture of Philosophy as a woman; and he
imagines her in the form of a woman, because the word was spoken
in the feminine gender in Greek and Latin; and because she leads
her listeners on as if with some elementary principles to perfect
knowledge, or like a mother she suckles her infants and feeds her
sons; or because women are seductresses, and just as women allure
men, so Philosophy, with her appearance of perfect beauty, allures
wise men.31
28. Quilligan, Allegory of Female Authority, 24-25.
29. For a broader overview of the history of the grammatical argument, see
Newman, God and the Goddesses; James Paxson, “Gender Personified, Personification
Gendered, and the Body Figuralized in Piers Plowman,” The Yearbook of Langland
Studies 12 (1998): 65-96 and “Personification’s Gender,” Rhetorica 16, no.2 (1998), 14979, doi:10.1525/rh.1998.16.2.149.
30. Newman, God and the goddesses; Helen Cooper, “Gender and Personification
in Piers Plowman,” Yearbook of Langland Studies 5 (1991): 31-48.
31. Quoted by Cooper, “Gender and Personification,” 31. “Configurat sibi mulierem Philosophiam; ideoque in speciem mulieris Philosophiam configurat, quia et
apud Graecos et apud Latinos feminino genere pronuntiatur et auditores suos quasi
quibusdam rudimentis adducit ad perfectam scientiam uel uti mater teneros lactat et
nutrit filios. Vel ideo quia mulieres allectrices sunt: sicut mulieres alliciunt uiros, ita
Philosophia specie perfectionis suae allicit homines sapientes.”
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Philosophia’s gender is first connected to grammar, but then the author
adds that it seems normal that philosophy would be represented as
a woman because she feeds men with wisdom just like mothers feed
their babies or because she allures men with the beauty of wisdom just
like women allure men. The personification’s function is compared to
certain roles which women perform, in particular those of mother and
seductress. It is futile to try and detach grammar from social meaning,
because we clearly see that feminine abstracta are associated with feminine characteristics time and again. From the moment that a concept is
personified, it becomes a person and thus it is assigned a gender and the
corresponding social position, role, and behavior. From that moment,
social gender is relevant to a personification’s gender.
There are other arguments to refute the deterministic power of grammar. For example, Barbara Newman notes that male personifications
are almost never of the kind she calls “Platonistic” as opposed to “Aristotelian,” “reading the former as epiphanies or emanations of a superior
reality, the latter as ‘accidents existing in a substance,’ personified only
for the sake of analytical clarity.”32 She claims that male personifications
never become as real, emotionally accessible, numinous, and serious as
female personifications. Therefore, not only is it so that female personifications are linked to feminine roles and characteristics, but also
the female gender of personifications apparently assures the figure’s
effectiveness in a way that maleness does not. Their gender is essential
to the functioning of the personification as an emanation of the divine.
Therefore, I will now proceed to give an overview of the critical literature
drawing on gender theory in explaining the gender of personifications.
I will draw together a variety of arguments and present them in the
context of the framework that was sketched earlier.

The Level of the Personifier: Women
According to de Beauvoir, woman is defined as everything that man
is not: she is immanent and passive, she is nature, materiality, and the
body. It may appear strange, then, that divine concepts would take on
32. Newman, God and the Goddesses, 34.
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female shapes. However, the fact that women personify positive and
even divine concepts does not necessarily mean that they are no longer
women. On the contrary, feminine characteristics such as immanence
and materiality and their status as object in relation to a male subject
assure the effectiveness of personification allegory. I will first discuss
how the position of women in the binary-hierarchical structure of gender relations may contribute to the effectiveness of female personification
allegory. First, personifications, as material renderings of an abstract
idea, might be female because women, as opposed to men, are associated
with immanence and materiality. Second, personifications, which mediate between humans and the divine, might be female because women
relate humans mutually.

Materiality and Immanence
First, I will discuss the implications of the fact that materiality and
immanence are coded as feminine. Because corporality is associated with
femaleness, personifications might be female simply because they have
bodies. But there is a deeper link between allegorical personifications,
materialization, and femaleness. Medieval allegorical creation developed
within the context of Neoplatonism.33 Late-antique Neoplatonists carried forward to the Middle Ages the ideas that language is naturally
linked to meaning and that allegory is capable of conveying knowledge
about the divine.34 These ideas were brought into practice most notably
by poets influenced by the so-called “School of Chartres,” namely the
philosophical allegorists Bernard Silvestris, Alan of Lille, and Jean of
Hauville.35 Two elements carry the narrative structure of their allegories:
33. Peter T. Struck, “Allegory and Ascent in Neoplatonism,” in The Cambridge
Companion to Allegory, ed. Rita Copeland and Peter T. Struck (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2010).
34. Struck, 57.
35. See Winthrop Wetherbee, Platonism and Poetry in the Twelfth Century: The
Literary Influence of the School of Chartres (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
1972); Jon Whitman, Interpretation and Allegory: Antiquity to the Modern Period
(Leiden: Brill, 2003); Jon Whitman, “Twelfth-Century Allegory: Philosophy and
Imagination,” in Copeland and Struck, Cambridge Companion to Allegory, 101-16.
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cosmology and personification. For us, what is most important is the way
in which cosmology and personification are intertwined. The creation
and the constitution of the cosmos happens through emanation, which
is depicted as a deeply gendered process. The universe is constituted by
an immaterial entity that is wholly transcendent, “the One.” The One
is the source of everything and contains everything that exists, but it is
also situated above everything else. It creates the different dimensions
of the universe by emanating “pure being.” The cosmos thus consists
of ever-descending layers of meaning. A first level of emanation is the
realm of Mind or intellectual reality. A second emanation is the realm
of the Soul. This level in turn generates the world and everything that
is material. How is this theory of emanation gendered? The creation
of the cosmos is depicted as the descent of the masculine principle,
which is one and all and in itself perfect, into the realm of the feminine,
which is other and in motion. The universe is constituted by their convergence. We thus recognize the binary-hierarchical model of gender
and the concept of the female as “other.” In this model of the world, it
is not surprising to find those natural powers that govern the cosmos
personified as women. Bernard Silvestris, for instance, describes in his
Cosmographia how the female Noys emanates from God, Nature from
Noys, and Silva from Nature. Claire Fanger notes “how deeply issues of
gendered embodiment are implicated Bernard’s lofty abstractions, in his
considerations of the relations between divinity and the world.”36 Noys,
Natura, and Silva are female because they represent the diversification
of the primal unity, which is itself eternal and motionless. The higher
principle, the “immobile unity of Being,” is represented as the masculine
principle, while the lower principle stands for “plurality and motion,”
marked by the imagery of the womb.37 Emanation is described as the
process of giving birth. The generative aspect of the divine is feminine
because women are associated with procreation and material existence.
Another hypothesis building on these ideas comes from Gordon
36. Claire Fanger, “The Formative Feminine and the Immobility of God: Gender
and Cosmogony in Bernard Silvestris’s Cosmographia,” in The Tongue of the Fathers:
Gender and Ideology In Twelfth-century Latin, ed. David J. Townsend and Andrew J.
Taylor (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1998), 80-101, 82.
37. Fanger, 92.
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Teskey. Wondering why personification reverses the gender hierarchy by
depicting elevated concepts as female, he gives the following explanation:
“It seems that by conferring on personifications the feminine gender,
matter is surreptitiously raised up from its logical place, which is beneath
the lowest species, into the realm of abstractions, giving these something
solid to stand on. What is the stuff out of which Shamefastness is made?
She is made of her gender.”38 Materializations of abstract concepts take
the female form precisely because they take on materiality. When a
higher principle descends and clothes itself in materiality, this is depicted
as a gendered process: the masculine principle clothes itself in feminine
materiality. Teskey connects this to Platonic ideas about male form and
female matter: “the project of cultural idealism is typically encoded as
the masculine imprinting of a feminine other.” 39 So, the male form of
the abstract concept imprints itself in formless matter, which is female.
Teskey further describes this process in Neoplatonist terms: “feminine
agents are both examples of the universals they instantiate and living
sources from which those universals cascade into the world.” 40 So, just
as Fanger noticed with regard to the Cosmographia, Teskey describes
how personifications might be female both because they are emanations
and because they give birth to matter through the process of emanation.
In a footnote, he makes a remark that is similar to what Newman says
about male personifications being less real. Teskey observes that male
personifications in The Faerie Queene “are demonstrably physical, as if
to make up for their relative insubstantiality.” 41
Further, notice how the imagery of the female body and especially
its reproductive functions are used in this schema to explain cosmological processes. This is an important factor in the functioning of
female personifications, which follows from the association of matter
with femaleness. As a consequence of their belonging to the material
realm, women are not allowed transcendence and are thus reduced to
corporality. Paradoxically, however, men’s bodies remain the standard
38. Gordon Teskey, Allegory and Violence (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press,
1996), 23.
39. Teskey, 23.
40. Teskey, 23.
41. Teskey, 22n31.
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“human body,” and women’s bodies are marked as “other.” So, the female
body is both “body” itself, as an undifferentiated mass, and the “other”
body, with marked characteristics. As a consequence, women’s bodies
are more value-laden than men’s, both negatively and positively. The
female body, then, is a site for symbolism, and its parts carry meaning.
Personifications, of which every body part and piece of clothing is read
symbolically, can signify various things by means of their female bodies.
For instance, giving birth and breastfeeding often serve as metaphors
within a personification allegory.
In conclusion, personifications are female because they are material and immanent instances of abstracta—materiality and immanence
being coded as feminine—and also because women’s bodies are more
marked and value-laden than men’s and are therefore more readily used
in symbolic configurations.

Relationality and Gender Roles
Second, I will discuss the implications of women’s place in relation to
men within the hierarchy of gender. Women and their bodies are classified according to their sexual and familial roles in relation to men.
The female gender of personifications therefore also or even primarily
functions in relation to the imagery of sexual relations and familial
ties, duties, and honor. Female personifications play the same role here
as women in the patriarchal family. Women link men to each other,
first, by reproducing the family and connecting men through blood
ties,42 and, second, by representing the honor of the men to which
they belong. Just so, personifications connect humans and the divine
or humans mutually through family relationships, and they symbolize
the family honor.
There are many different constellations in which female personifications may fulfil this function. Personifications can relate individuals or
groups to each other or to God. Mostly, these relations are hierarchical.
42. As described by Claude Lévi-Strauss, Les Structures élémentaires de la parenté
(Paris: Mouton, 1949), and from a feminist perspective by Gayle Rubin, “The Traffic
in Women: Notes on the ‘Political Economy’ of Sex,” in Toward an Anthropology of
Women, ed. Rayna R. Reiter (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1975).
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They also often involve implied third parties, who define the relationship by being excluded from it. The personification functions either as
a mediator or as a substitute: either she mediates between the parties
and is herself related to both of them, or a whole group is united in her
person. She can also be both at the same time. The personification can
take on many roles, but the most important seem to be mother, daughter, and bride/beloved. I distinguish three general attitudes toward these
personifications: they are honored, desired, and/or victimized. These
reflect the attitudes that courtly literature exhibits towards women.
Therefore, the literature on gender in courtly literature is of use in
analyzing medieval female personifications. As in courtly literature,
the family that is evoked is part of elite culture. Together with gender,
this aspect is crucial to the functioning of female personifications. The
personifications are not only female, but also of noble lineage. They
demand respect and honor, and when their honor is endangered, this
evokes serious anxiety and can have repercussions. However, they receive
this honor through their relation to their male relatives, to whom they
are subordinate. Thus, personifications make use of “the leverage that
women had not as people, but as a conceptual category,” in the words of
Daisy Delogu.43 The hierarchies of gender and class converge in these
figures in order to transfer these hierarchies to all kinds of interpersonal
or intergroup relations. As Delogu explains: “The gender binary that has
pervaded thought and culture from the Middle Ages to our own times
provides a ready-made and almost universally accepted hierarchy which
can be deployed in a range of other contexts to express ideas about the
respective situations of persons or groups.” 44 Female personifications
“structure relationships of inclusion and exclusion, establish hierarchies,
and help to define both self and other.” 45
We will first look at how personifications might be used in order to
define the self in relation to the divine. Humans are sometimes pictured
in direct relation to the divine, but more often the relation is mediated by a female figure such as Mary or female personifications. And
even when there is a direct relation, we notice the tendency to picture
43. Delogu, Allegorical Bodies, 14.
44. Delogu, 43.
45. Delogu, 43.
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this relation as one between a feminine and a masculine being. Either
the human soul is described as Christ’s bride or God’s child, or Christ
is feminized and takes on the role of a mother, in order to relate the
human to God as a father. There certainly is a tendency not to relate a
male human figure to the (ultimately male) divinity.
Rosemary Radford Ruether has suggested two reasons why men
“continually reinvented the ‘religious feminine.’” 46 Her overview of
divine female figures throughout history, Goddesses and the Divine
Feminine, reaches the conclusion that such concepts were probably
always invented to serve male interests. The first interest they served,
according to Ruether, is to provide a way out of the dilemma that “a
male monotheistic God and heterosexist culture” posed to men: “for
males to love God meant that a human male must love a divine male.” 47
This would mean an “explicit elaboration of male-male eros,” which in
such a culture would be forbidden.48 I think that this argument cannot
hold: for reasons that I will not expand upon here, it is not possible to
speak of hetero- and homosexuality in premodern periods.49 Instead, I
would argue that these relations are male-female more because of the
structure and hierarchy of gender as discussed earlier. In relation to the
man, woman is subordinated, but all humans together are the woman in
relation to God. “Masculine” and “feminine” are then used as a metaphor
for “higher” or “stronger” or “more spiritual” versus “lower” or “weaker”
or “less transcendent.” Medieval sexuality was thus seen less in the absolute terms of two opposite sexes than in the relation between the higher
principle of masculinity and the lower principle of femininity (embodied
by men and women) that are necessarily bound up with each other as a
sign of both human fallenness and redemption. So, because the relation
46. Rosemary Radford Ruether, Goddesses and the Divine Feminine: A Western.
Religious History (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), 303.
47. Ruether, 304.
48. Ruether, 304.
49. See David M. Halperin, “Is there a History of Sexuality?” History and Theory
28, no.3 (1989): 257-74, doi:10.2307/2505179; James A. Schultz, “Heterosexuality as a
Threat to Medieval Studies,” Journal of the History of Sexuality 15, no.1 (2006): 14-29,
http://www.jstor.org/stable/4617242; Helmut Puff, “Same-Sex Possibilities,” in
Bennett and Karras, Oxford Handbook of Women and Gender, 379-95.
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between humans and the divine is a hierarchical relation, it is described
in gendered terms, gender being perceived as the primary hierarchy. For
instance, the fact that the soul is not only likened to a bride but also to
a child indicates that this is not about “eros,” but about love and care
within a relationship of unequal power characterized by dependence.50
Ruether gives a second reason why men would invent goddesses.
Referring to the goddesses of the ancient Near East, she argues that
they protect men in power.51 Indeed, the relation of certain individuals
or groups to the divine, through female mediators or by representing
the group itself as a personification, can be employed to legitimate and
preserve the power of those individuals or groups.52 In this case, the
personification serves to relate people to each other rather than to God.
Or rather, it sets off people against each other by relating some more
closely to God than others. This construction serves two functions in
society. First, it legitimizes existing power relations and the position of
powerful groups in society by relating them to the divine. Second, the
construction is used to demarcate the boundaries between groups and
prohibit transgressions.53
50. See Caroline Walker Bynum, “Jesus as Mother and Abbot as Mother: Some
Themes in Twelfth-Century Cistercian Writing,” Harvard Theological Review 70,
no.3,4 (1977): 257-84, http://www.jstor.org/stable/1509631. Bynum remarks that
“[b]oth in references to earthly authority figures and in reference to God, a maternal
image is an image of dependence or union or incorporation”(269). She further mentions that “sexually inverted images (i.e., calling men “women”) were part of a larger
pattern of using inverted language to express personal dependence and the dependence of one’s values on God” (272).
51. Ruether, Goddesses and the Divine Feminine, 303-4.
52. For instance, Hannah W. Matis, “Early-Medieval Exegesis of the Song of
Songs and the Maternal Language of Clerical Authority,” Speculum 89, no.2 (2014):
372-73, describes how Carolingian clerics identified themselves with (body parts of )
the bride of Song of Songs, whom they interpreted as a maternal figure, in order to
legitimize and heighten their authority. By representing themselves as the motherfigure in relation to the parvuli or children, they both excluded the laity and manipulated power relations within their own ranks.
53. For instance, David Nirenberg, “Conversion, Sex, and Segregation: Jews and
Christians in Medieval Spain,” American Historical Review 107, no.4 (2002): 1065-93,
doi:10.1086/532664, shows how in the literature of medieval Spain, sexual relations
of any nature between Christian women and Jewish or Muslim men were depicted
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An important precedent for this kind of medieval personifications is
the Old Testament’s depiction of the Israelites as God’s beloved bride,
which David Carr calls a “theological marriage matrix”: “In this matrix
the believing community is depicted as the female spouse of the male
god—called on to love that God with the exclusive love of a wife and
punished for failure to do so.” 54 Christians replaced the figure of Synagoga with Ecclesia but kept this tradition, as witnessed by the interpretations of the Song of Songs as a love song between the Church and
God.55 Although interpretations of the Song of Songs put the emphasis
on desire and love, elsewhere the “theological marriage matrix” draws
on gender roles such as the requirement of absolute faithfulness from
the wife and the man’s dominance over her. The people are represented
as female, then, because of the hierarchy and familial duties that exist
between them and God.
But a figure such as the Church does not only enable a group of people to enter into a relationship with God: they also, as individuals, enter
into a relationship with the figure of the Church itself. Personifications
of groups of people also connect the people in that group to each other
and against other groups via the figure of personification, and in this
process gender plays an important role. This aspect of female personification allegory has not received much attention for the medieval period,
but it has from theorists of the modern nation-state.56 I believe that the
as the violation of the brides of Christ and the daughters of God and their violation
as the violation of God’s rights. Conversely, there are the narratives in which pagan
women are converted to Christianity and marry Christian men, which is depicted
as a victory of one group over another, as in Sharon Kinoshita, “‘Pagans Are Wrong
and Christians Are Right: Alterity, Gender, and Nation in the Chanson de Roland,”
Journal of Medieval and Early Modern Studies 31, no.1 (2001): 79-111.
54. David Carr, “Gender and the Shaping of Desire in the Song of Songs and Its
Interpretation,” Journal of Biblical Literature 119, no.2 (2000): 239, http://www.jstor.
org/stable/3268485.
55. Friedrich Ohly, Hohelied-Studien: Grundzüge einer Geschichte der
Hoheliedauslegung des Abendlandes bis um 1200 (Wiesbaden: Steiner Verlag, 1958);
E. Ann Matter, The Voice of My Beloved: The Song of Songs in Western Medieval
Christianity (Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1990); Ann Astell, The
Song of Songs in the Middle Ages (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1995).
56. Nira Yuval-Davis, “Gender and Nation,” in Women, Ethnicity and Nationalism:
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core of these ideas could be applied to medieval personifications such as
the Church too. Mrinalini Sinha lists four ways in which familial and
gendered imagery—the nation as a “domestic genealogy”—functions
in a nationalist discourse. First, the imagery represents the nation “as
an innate or organic community” whose members are related by family
ties, which naturalizes the state and its power over the citizens.57 Second,
the nation represented as a relative can activate “instrumental passions”:
Thus the nation in the form of an abused or humiliated mother
appeals to her sons and daughters, albeit often in differently
gendered ways, to come to her protection and restore her honor.
Similarly, the nation as fatherland calls upon its sons and daughters to obey the father and fulfil their respective gendered duties to
the nation. . . . Most often, perhaps, the nation is represented as a
female body—“to love, to possess, and to protect”—in the discourse of nationalism.58
Third, the imagery naturalizes hierarchies both within and between
nations and signifies “hierarchy within unity”: the message is that hierarchies in and between groups of people are natural and benefit everyone,
just as, within a patriarchal family, parents have power over children and
husbands over wives.59 Fourth, the nation’s double role as a “force for
both change and continuity” is negotiated via gender difference: women
are identified with tradition and continuity and men with change and
modernity.60 This description of how gendered imagery functions in
establishing relations between people and groups is applicable to medieval collective personifications too. The figure of the Church as a mother
establishes the community of Christians as an organic community in
which the members are bound to each other by family ties. Second, by,
for instance, depicting her as a mother who is in need of help or whose
The Politics of Transition, ed. Rick Wilford and Robert L. Miller (London:
Routledge, 1998); Mrinalini Sinha, Gender and Nation (Washington, DC: American
Historical Association, 2006).
57. Sinha, Gender and Nation, 17.
58. Sinha, 18.
59. Sinha, 19.
60. Sinha, 21.
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honor is threatened, this imagery may be used to activate instrumental
passions. A man’s honor is then made dependent on the sexual honor of
the women that belong to him.61 Third, it naturalizes hierarchies, both
between groups, as we see in the figure of the personified Synagogue,
who represents the Jews but is superseded by the Church,62 and within
groups, as we see for instance when the clergy identifies itself with the
mother figure in order to claim natural authority over the laity.63
Daisy Delogu’s recent book Allegorical Bodies: Power and Gender in
Late Medieval France discusses in detail the use of the allegory of France
and the allegory of the University of Paris during the Hundred Years
War. These are personifications that mediate between political groups
and the figure of the king. First, Christine de Pizan creates the maternal figure of France, whose children are in conflict with their mother
and among themselves. Delogu explains how “imagining Libera as a
maternal figure imposes a bond of natural love among her children,
and between the children/subjects and the kingdom.”64 The French are
thus admonished to fulfil their civil duties as loyally as they would their
filial duties. Delogu further hypothesizes that the allegorical figure of
France should serve as an alternative for the figure of the king, whose
“historical and textual absence” at that time prompted Christine de
Pizan to “construct an alternative site or mechanism for the production of political and social identity.”65 Second, Jean Gerson makes use
of conventional notions of the family as well by creating the allegorical
figure of the University as “the devoted and obedient fille du roy.”66 The
allegory of the University allows Gerson to “construct a platform for
61. See Nirenberg, “Conversion, Sex, and Segregation.”
62. On the figure of Synagoga in medieval art, see Sara Lipton, “The Temple is
my Body: Gender, Carnality, and Synagoga in the ‘Bible Moralisée,’” in Imagining the
Self, Imagining the Other: Visual Representation and Jewish-Christian Dynamics in the
Middle Ages and Early Modern Period, ed. Eva Frojmovic (Leiden: Brill, 2002), 12963; Nina Rowe, The Jew, the Cathedral and the Medieval City: Synagoga and Ecclesia in
the Thirteenth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).
63. Bynum, “Jesus as Mother”; Matis, “The Maternal Language of Clerical
Authority.”
64. Delogu, Allegorical Bodies, 73.
65. Delogu, 16.
66. Delogu, 16.
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political action for himself, and for the University masters generally,”
but because University is a daughter, she poses no threat to the king’s
authority.67 Gerson’s University is both the king’s daughter and the
mother of the masters and students. In this last function, she aids the
translatio studii et imperii: “Just as real women served as instruments
in the transfer of secular power, so too the female-gendered University
reproduces knowledge, ensuring its transmission from one generation
to the next.”68 Delogu thus finds that these personifications “conform
to normative expectations of femininity for medieval women.”69 They
appear as the courtly beloved, as the object of affection and desire, or
as a mother. Sometimes, they are depicted as a victimized woman: “By
portraying France as a damsel in distress, the authors of such allegorical
fictions invite a masculine, and in particular chivalric, public to come
to the aid of the kingdom, in accordance with medieval expectations of
masculinity.”70 It is only medieval women of the nobility, however, who
can play this role: these women often functioned as intermediaries at
courts, and so do personifications.71
One last instance should be mentioned to round off our overview of
the literature on this aspect of female personifications. Emily C. Francomano’s book Wisdom and her Lovers mentions Augustine’s use of the
personification of Wisdom represented as “a lover who can be shared
among male philosophers joined in their pursuit of enlightenment.”72
She “strengthen[s] the homosocial and spiritual bonds among philosophers,” thereby again representing the process of translatio studii.73
She also offers a surrogate for a human spouse. Francomano perceives a
67. Delogu, 16.
68. Delogu, 87.
69. Delogu, 8.
70. Delogu, 8.
71. See Schiebinger, “Feminine Icons,” 684. Schiebinger, talking about the female
personifications of Science in the early-modern period, says: “The feminine icon was
born and bred within elite culture, and I would argue that it represented women’s
place in that culture more than it did real women of the past. Women’s role in the
court and salon was one of mediation.”
72. Emily C. Francomano, Wisdom and Her Lovers in Medieval and Early-Modern
Hispanic Literature (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 2.
73. Francomano, 3-4.
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tension in the combination of “the homosocial hermeneutics of wisdom
literature and the imagined heterosocial and heterosexual relationships
that men in search of Wisdom forge with her.”74 This triangular relationship between men and a desired woman, however, is described in
feminist theory by Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick’s book Between Men.75 The
rupture of the continuum between nonsexual and sexual male bonds is
disguised by positing the figure of a desired female; in other words, male
philosophers’ relations with each other must be mediated by a female
figure in order to banish the idea of sexual relations between themselves.
This framework could also prove useful for female personifications.
The main interest of Francomano’s book, however, is the “deep-seated
anxiety about potential confusion between feminine imagery and real,
extratextual women.”76 Authors who make use of the female personification of Wisdom feel very acutely that they cannot at the same time make
use of the feminine and avoid associating Wisdom with mere mortal
women. Because of the fact that a female personification “look[s] like
a woman, nurture[s] like a mother, sing[s] like a siren, please[s] like a
bride, and share[s] her body like a common woman”—in short: answers
to all the expectations of normative femininity—that she inevitably will
be confused “with real, extratextual women.”77

The Level of the Personified: Ideas
The functioning of female personification at the literal level thus revolves
around corporality and gender roles. First, women are associated with
corporality and earthly existence. Personification, the embodied form of
an abstract concept, is female because embodiment is coded as female.
Second, women are seen in relation to men. They structure and symbolize relations and hierarchies between people. Female personifications
too perform these female gender roles. So, to the question of why these
concepts are materialized as female, the answer is that they are because
74. Francomano, 2.
75. Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, Between Men: English Literature and Male Homosocial
Desire (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985).
76. Francomano, Wisdom and Her Lovers, 2.
77. Francomano, 3.
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materiality itself is coded as female and because they mediate between
humans and the divine, as well as between humans mutually, which is
the symbolic function of women. The second question is now whether
the concepts themselves are coded as female even when they are not
materialized.
Here, the principle of immanence returns. A personification is characterized by immanence because in its human form it is part of earthly
existence. But many immaterial concepts like Wisdom or the Church
are characterized by immanence themselves, because they refer to the
divine at work in the creation, the non-transcendent and therefore
feminine features of the divine. Barbara Newman notes with regard to
Hildegard of Bingen that “while masculine imagery of the Creator tends
to stress God’s transcendence, feminine metaphors place the accent on
immanence.”78 Similarly, personifications represent the workings of a
transcendent God in his creation: Sapientia, Caritas, Ecclesia and the
others are, in their most elevated form, emanations of God that are at
the same time divine and active in people. Therefore, their immanence
is best represented by the female form. As such, they become mediators
between God and his creation: “Hildegard saw [the feminine] as the
dimension in which mediation or, at a higher intensity, union between
Creator and creature can be achieved.”79 Newman further connects this
mediating function to specifically feminine modes of time: “The feminine designations . . . evoke God’s interactions with the cosmos insofar
as they are timeless or perpetually repeated.”80
Simone de Beauvoir provides another argument: “Man feminizes the
ideal he sets up before him as the essential Other, because woman is the
material representation of alterity; that is why almost all allegories in
78. Barbara Newman, Sister of Wisdom: St. Hildegard’s Theology of the Feminine
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), 64. See also María Isabel Flisfisch,
“Las figuras femeninas en la Symphonia de Hildegard de Bingen: Caritas, Sapientia y
Ecclesia,” Revista Chilena de Literatura 62 (2003): 127-44.
79. Newman, Sister of Wisdom, 45.
80. Newman, 45. Newman then goes on to argue that the principles of the
feminine divine—theophany, exemplarity, immanence, and synergy—can be seen as
conditions of the Incarnation, which in Hildegard’s view is “an event beyond time and
history in the sphere of the eternal, of the feminine divine” (46).
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language as in pictorial representation, are women.”81 In other words, if
concepts are external to man, they are pictured as feminine because they
are Other, even if they represent partly transcendental ideals.
With regard to the personifications that represent collectivities such
as a city, a nation, or a religious community, we can add that the figure
of a woman also represents the concept of collectivity itself. The female
is the marked gender, so that men are more easily perceived as individuals (depending on the intersections with ethnicity, religion, class, etc.),
but women are always also perceived as a collective.82 Arguably, a male
personification would be viewed more as an exemplar, a historical figure,
or an autonomous power, but less as a collective entity or abstract concept.83 Inasmuch as women are “the Other,” they are less differentiated,
and inasmuch as they are the object to the male subject, they are granted
less individuality, so that they can more easily be turned into symbols.
The most comprehensive work on female personifications to date,
Barbara Newman’s God and the Goddesses, follows this line of thought,
but situates its arguments exclusively on the figural level. Newman is
opposed to looking at female personifications merely as grammatical or literary figures. She pleads for considering their theological and
spiritual meaning. In doing so, however, she separates spiritual meaning from social meaning and claims in effect that the two exclude each
other. I want to argue that they do not and that the figural level of
81. de Beauvoir, Second Sex, 211.
82. For instance, Hrabanus Maurus’s ninth-century De Rerum Naturis links
figures from the Old Testament to the New and figures from both to all sorts of
individuals or groups that play a role in salvation history. A quick scan of these
typologies reveals that men are mostly seen as prefigurations of Christ, the devil, or
groups of individuals such as priests, the apostles, or the prophets, while women are
predominantly interpreted as the Church, the Synagogue, souls, or abstract concepts.
Hrabanus Maurus, B. Rabani Mauri Fuldensis Abbatis Et Moguntini Archiepiscopi:
Opera Omnia, ed. J.-P Migne (1864-1878; repr. Turnhout: Brepols, 1966).
83. Schiebinger, “Feminine Icons.” Schiebinger discusses the decline of female
personifications of science at the beginning of the nineteenth century and their
replacement by images of individual male scientists. Compare also the figures of
Natura and Genius in Alan of Lille’s De planctu naturae and Jean de Meun’s Roman de
la rose: while Natura is a personification of the concept of Nature, Genius is a representative of the priesthood, not a personification of it.
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personifications can be traced back to the literal level. First, I will briefly
reproduce Newman’s argument. She describes the “allegorical goddesses” as a “third pantheon,” besides the saints and the old pagan gods,
surrounding the monotheistic God of Christendom.84 She argues that
female personifications “add an irreducible fourth dimension to the
spiritual universe. As emanations of the Divine, mediators between God
and the cosmos, embodied universals, and not least, ravishing objects of
identification and desire, the goddesses substantially transformed and
deepened Christendom’s concept of God, introducing religious possibilities beyond the ambit of scholastic theology and bringing them to
vibrant imaginative life.”85 They derive their power from representing
the “feminine aspect of God”: as women, they represent the aspect of
reality that is earthly (emanated) and embodied, and as such they can
function as mediators and objects of desire.86 The way in which Newman
describes the functioning of female personifications thus corresponds to
the arguments described in the previous section of this paper. However,
for her, the fact that allegorical goddesses are idealized figures representing theological concepts means that they do no longer represent
women: they are “female but not necessarily women.”87 She asserts that
female personifications are not representations of women but modes of
religious imagination. They offer a safe and efficient way to theologize
about divine concepts, for instance because they can represent “God’s
inner conflicts, so to speak, in much the same way that allegory enabled
them to dramatize human conflicts.”88 Another reason for their existence would be the need to imagine divinity as both male and female,
because “human beings come in two sexes.”89 She therefore insists that
they “were not women: they did not have bodies, and although they
were symbolically virgins, lovers, mothers, and brides, they bore no
taint of mortal frailty.”90 Newman wants to separate positive feminine
84. Newman, God and the Goddesses, 1.
85. Newman, God and the Goddesses, 2-3.
86. Newman, Sister of Wisdom, xvii.
87. Newman, God and the Goddesses, 38.
88. Newman, God and the Goddesses, 39.
89. Newman, God and the Goddesses, 19.
90. Newman, God and the Goddesses, 310.
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symbolism from the often negative way that real women’s bodies and
roles were perceived in society. She never specifies what she means by
“female” and by “women” in separating the two, unless by pointing out
that “Lady Philosophy suffers from no weakness of mind; Lady Poverty,
though beautiful and nude, arouses no lust in St. Francis; Mater Ecclesia does not lack authority, nor is Frau Minne periodically unclean.”91
These are all the negative aspects associated with women’s materiality as
opposed to men’s more spiritual status: women are weak of mind, their
bodies are unclean and arouse lust, and they lack authority. This is the
view of women that arises when the gendered body and soul are seen
in opposition to each other, and these are the qualities that do not get
figuratively transferred to men in the symbolic realm. The aspects of the
feminine that qualify for that realm are the aspects that are valued when
body and soul are seen as a harmonic whole: in that case, the abstract
concepts of the body, of complementarity, of erotic love, of gender
roles can be used in the religious imagination. What Newman means
is that it is possible to abstract women’s association with immanence
and materiality from women’s lower place in society. I do not think
that such an artificial separation can be maintained. What is actually
valued in abstracted concepts such as materiality or motherhood is the
celebration of the lower principle that upholds the higher principle, a
celebration of the hierarchy itself. Women’s base materiality, on the one
hand, and female symbolic materiality, on the other, are two sides of the
same coin. It is the same system looked at from different perspectives:
if one looks at women as opposed to men, one only discerns negativity,
but if one zooms out and considers how women are necessary to men’s
existence in providing the material from which they are formed, this
might be considered positive. Therefore, I would contest the view that
we can separate positively valued femininity from negatively valued
femaleness, although this may have been what medieval authors tried
to do. Newman says that the goddesses have no bodies. However, they
signify positive female characteristics by being female: their body is
the symbol by which they communicate their meaning. Also, when
female symbols are transferred to men, we often see that they remain
91. Newman, God and the Goddesses, 310.
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associated with women’s bodies, for instance when Christ takes on the
role of a mother by being depicted with lactating breasts. Elsewhere,
men are connected with female symbols because they deliberately want
to take up a lower place in the hierarchy or they want to be able to relate
to God as a woman to a man, meaning that traditional gender roles are
implicated in these symbols. Even when authors stress positive female
symbolism, this happens within a system that opposes female to male,
and that values male over female. Female symbols do not stand on their
own, and gender relations are also at work in the religious imagination.
So, the figural level of personifications builds on the literal level; the
concepts themselves have feminine associations, but this is rooted in the
literal level and the female bodies of personifications.

The Level of the Personification: Literary Figures
If we look at personification as a literary figure, we again find the same
gendered concepts that make plausible the choice for female personifications. Whether personification is seen as a literary figure that has to be
interpreted, as a figure that contributes to memorization, as an instance
of figurative language, as a trope, or as allegory, the discourse for talking
about it makes use of gendered conceptualizations.
Daisy Delogu draws attention to how “the very processes of allegorical writing and reading are imagined by their practitioners in gendered
terms.”92 Allegorical reading was a “generative process” in which the
male exegete drew meaning from the fecund body of the text.93 Furthermore, the allegorical text was frequently described as veiled, “and it was
the object of the (again male) reader to strip allegory of its covering, to
lay bare and possess allegory’s hidden meaning.”94
Emily Francomano, given her focus on the personification of Wisdom, chooses to focus on the role of female personification in the arts of
memory, which “implicitly valued this supposed incongruence between
the material and the spiritual, the sensual and the intellective.”95 As she
92. Delogu, Allegorical Bodies, 19.
93. Delogu, 19.
94. Delogu, 19.
95. Francomano, Wisdom and Her Lovers, 5. See also 11-26.
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puts it, “[t]he opposition between woman and wisdom makes the personification all the more memorable.”96 Moreover, because wisdom is
figuratively seen as “the body of desired knowledge,” it takes on the form
of the desired female body.97 In this capacity, the personification offers
both an emotional and an erotic stimulation to memorize her teachings.
More broadly, the Jewish Platonist Philo and the Christian Platonist
Origen connected the literal level of the text with the body of the reader
and the figural level with the soul.98 If the body is coded as female, then
the literal level can be thought of as female. The outer appearance and
gender of the personification are situated on the literal level. We can
then not only connect the female body of the personification as a body
to femaleness, but also connect the literal level of the allegory through
the metaphor of the body to femaleness.
James Paxson offers a similar argument on personification as a trope.
He discusses how “personified characters in classical or early medieval
literature were women because Personification as a concept (and itself
personified) could be thought of as having the gendered qualities of the
feminine.”99 First, tropes and figuration in general were characterized as
feminine because women were associated with “ornamentation, seduction, excess” and with masking, dressing up, concealing, and translating.100 Woman stands for the non-transcendent aspect of reality, for the
visible outer layer of an invisible reality (sometimes considered positively
as an emanation, sometimes negatively as a concealment). Woman thus
becomes a metaphor for figuration itself. Second, personification is “the
figure of figuration,” too, because “[i]t is always already constituted
according to the imaginary features of concealment, clothing, cosmetics,
facades, and so forth. These descriptive concepts hinge on the structural
96. Francomano, 5.
97. Francomano, 5.
98. David Dawson, “Plato’s Soul and the Body of the Text in Philo and Origen,” in
Interpretation and Allegory: Antiquity to the Modern Period, ed. Jon Whitman (Leiden:
Brill, 2003), 89-108.
99. Paxson, “Personification’s Gender,” 157.
100. Paxson, 168. See also Delogu, Allegorical Bodies: “The practice of allegory
was also connected to a certain indeterminacy, instability, or multiplicity of meaning,
suggesting that allegory, like woman, might be fickle or duplicitous” (19).
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oppositions of insides/outsides, substrates/surfaces, unseen/seen, content/form, primary/secondary.”101 Tropes work by means of concealment
and covering; because both personification and woman are metaphors
for denoting this process, personifications take on female shape.
The discourse on the concept of allegory is governed by the same
metaphors. First, in Neoplatonist thought, allegory itself was seen as a
form of emanation. The fifth-century Neoplatonist philosopher Proclus
believed that literary texts offer indirect access to a higher level of reality through allegory. According to Peter Struck, this “view of the One
as an entirely transcendent entity that also still (somehow) manifests
itself in visible, tangible, concrete reality, sets out a paradox that is a
natural incubator of allegorical thinking.”102 Indeed, this way of thinking provided one of the foundations of the medieval understanding of
allegory, mostly through the immensely popular reception in Western
Europe of the works of Dionysius the Aeropagite, who might have been
a student of Proclus. So, if allegory could be seen as a process of emanation, it could be affected by the discourse on emanation as a process of
feminine engendering out of the masculine immobile principle. Female
personifications, then, are female because they are emanations at three
levels: at the level of the personifier, because they are embodied; at the
level of the personified, because they represent immanent concepts; and
lastly at the level of the personification figure, because allegory itself is
a form of emanation.
Second, the structure of allegory, in Daisy Delogu’s words, is “predicated upon a sustained and productive tension between form and meaning, as well as upon a state of ontological alienation.”103 Paxson says
the same when he declares that personification involves “the radical
suspension of fixed ontic categories such as bodily/abstract, human/
non-human or living/non-living.” 104 According to him, this rhetorical
subversion then spreads to the ontic category female/male. In Delogu’s
account, the “ontological alienation” that characterizes (personification) allegory “allows us to perceive a parallel between allegory and
101. Paxson, “Personification’s Gender,” 172.
102. Struck, “Allegory and Ascent,” 59.
103. Delogu, Allegorical Bodies, 15.
104. Paxson, “Gender Personified,” 164.
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women, themselves often cast, like allegory, as useful, but potentially
untrustworthy, intermediaries.”105 This reminds us of Barbara Newman’s
hypothesis that “Christians, accustomed to thinking of God as threeyet-one, of Christ as God-yet-man, and of Mary as virgin-yet-mother,
came to regard paradox itself as a touchstone of revealed truth,” and
therefore saw the embodiment of a divine concept in female form as such
an absurdity that it must be true.106 However, as Emily Francomano’s
book about the literary reception of and responses to the female personification of Wisdom shows, when readers took notice of the incongruity
between divine concept and female form—and they very often did—this
was “a source of continual anxiety.”107 She finds repeated warnings not
to confuse female personifications with real women. Therefore, I do
not think that we must have recourse to the concept of paradox as such
to explain the seeming illogicality of female personifications. I would
suggest that it is not so much subversion that dictates personification’s
gender as it is the association of femaleness with the corporeal and
non-transcendent aspects of being human. This association, of course,
although not paradoxical in itself, does give rise to paradox because it
necessarily has to be denied in order for the exalted personification to
function. Personifications derive their effectiveness from taking the place
of women in the symbolic order, but any associations with negatively
perceived elements of femaleness must be banned. The two cannot
be separated, however, which causes the anxiety that Francomano has
documented.

Conclusion
Personifications cannot be reduced to either grammatical figure or theological concept. The gender of personifications, then, cannot be reduced
to either grammatical gender or ideational value. When it is personified,
a concept assumes human shape and a human identity, which entails
social identity and gender. Many scholars have contributed arguments
about the female gender of personifications. Those arguments that build
105. Delogu, Allegorical Bodies, 15.
106. Newman, God and the Goddesses, 323.
107. Francomano, Wisdom and Her Lovers, 6.
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on gender theory can be situated on three levels, namely the personifier,
the personified, and the personification figure. I have given an overview
of these arguments and suggested that the same principles return on all
three levels and are grounded in the meanings accorded to female bodies
and gender roles. The central concepts are alterity and relativity: women
are defined as the “other” in relation to men. The masculine is either
invisible and neutral or it is positive; the feminine is either negatively or
positively defined in relation to the masculine. So, even when feminine
qualities are valued, they are valued in the hierarchical relation to male
qualities, which means that they are valued either for their otherness or
for their complementarity. First of all, because men are associated with
transcendence, women are associated with corporality, materiality, and
immanence. Therefore, the material shape of personifications is female.
Second, because the male body is seen as the standard body, the female
body is marked and offers strong symbolic possibilities. Third, women’s
otherness defines their roles in society: they are seen in relation to men
and hierarchically subordinated to them. The functioning of personifications in relation to humans and the divine is also governed by the
principles of relationality and hierarchy. On the level of the personified,
the same principles of immanence, otherness, and collectivity play a role,
as well as the principles of hierarchy and relationality. Personifications
may represent aspects of the divine, in which case these principles are
idealized and elevated, but they are grounded in the same social system
that relegates women to the lower place in the hierarchy. Finally, on
the level of personification as a literary figure, we again encountered the
principles of embodiment and materiality. The choice for female personifications is governed by a complex interplay of factors: by grammar,
by the ideational value of the personified concept, and by the dominant
literary discourse. What unites all these factors, however, is the one
deciding factor: female personifications make use of the symbolic values
of female bodies and the structure of gender in society, on the level of
the personifier, on the level of the personified, and the personification
figure. The conclusion must be that in becoming human, personifications become fully human. Female personifications, then, are not only
female but also women.
Ghent University (Belgium)

mff ,

wouters
http://ir.uiowa.edu/mff/vol53/iss2/

37

